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 NIRMALYA KUMAR, LISA K. SCHEER, and JAN-BENEDICT E.M. STEENKAMP*
 Using data from automobile dealers in the Netherlands, the authors
 find that dealers' punitive actions toward their key suppliers are affected
 by their perceptions of their own and their supplier's interdependence and
 punitive capabilities, as well as by the supplier's punitive actions. Punitive
 actions are affected by interdependence, but a more complete picture is
 achieved by also examining punitive capability. The authors test hypothe-
 ses based on bilateral deterrence, conflict spiral, and relative power the-
 ories, but none of these comprehensively explains the effects of both total
 power and power asymmetry. Dealer punitive actions are inhibited as
 total interdependence increases, but are promoted as total punitive capa-
 bility increases. Using spline regression, the authors find that interdepen-
 dence asymmetry has no direct effect on punitive actions, whereas
 punitive capability asymmetry does. As dealers' punitive capability advan-
 tage as compared with their suppliers' increases, dealers make greater
 use of punitive actions, whereas they use fewer punitive actions as their
 punitive capability deficit increases. The authors also find that dealers
 with a relative advantage in dependence or punitive capability are more
 likely to reciprocate their supplier's punitive actions.
 Interdependence, Punitive Capability, and the
 Reciprocation of Punitive Actions in
 Channel Relationships
 Researchers in marketing recently have devoted much at-
 tention to relationship-building activities that promote trust
 and commitment (e.g., Anderson and Weitz 1992; Heide
 and John 1992; Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp 1995a, b;
 Morgan and Hunt 1994). This parallels the groundswell of
 collaborative relationships that are emerging to exploit effi-
 cient consumer response, electronic data interchange, and
 just-in-time (JIT) technologies (Kumar 1996). The interde-
 pendence involved in relationships such as these inherently
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 national Institute for Management Development, Lausanne, Switzerland (e-
 mail: kumar@imd.ch). Lisa K. Scheer is Associate Professor of Marketing,
 College of Business and Public Administration, University of Missouri-
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 gives each channel firm the ability to support, as well as dis-
 rupt, the other's operations through punitive actions, inten-
 tional acts that inflict negative consequences on a partner.
 Although punitive acts might indicate a "sick relationship"
 (Morgan and Hunt 1994), there are situations in which they
 are legitimate (French and Raven 1959, p. 161). For exam-
 ple, a manufacturer could take appropriate punitive action to
 halt one dealer whose dysfunctional behavior undermines
 other dealers. Automakers justly impose previously negoti-
 ated fines on their JIT suppliers for late delivery. Punitive
 actions do not always indicate malice, for they are some-
 times necessary, appropriate, or fair (Scheer 1993).
 In pursuit of greater understanding about the characteris-
 tics of channel relationships that incite or inhibit punitive
 actions, we examine three elements. First, interdependence
 affects the partners' likelihood of engaging in various be-
 haviors (Buchanan 1992; Gundlach and Cadotte 1994;
 Heide 1994). Are punitive actions rarely employed in high-
 ly interdependent channels, or does the greater mutual pow-
 er promote greater punitive acts? What impact does interde-
 pendence asymmetry have on the more and less dependent
 partners' punitive actions?
 Second, each firm's punitive capability, the ability and
 willingness to inflict negative consequences on its channel
 Journal of Marketing Research
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 partner, also might play a role. A firm that stockpiles puni-
 tive capability signals its readiness to take punitive actions.
 But do the effects of total punitive capability and punitive
 capability asymmetry mirror those of interdependence?
 Third, the partner's punitive actions also must be consid-
 ered. Channel firms tend to reciprocate punitive actions
 (Frazier and Rody 1991; Frazier and Summers 1986), but is
 this tendency moderated by interdependence asymmetry and
 punitive capability asymmetry?
 THEORY
 We focus on a channel firm's punitive actions, acts
 through which the firm intentionally inflicts damaging con-
 sequences on its partner (Gaski and Nevin 1985; Lusch
 1976). A firm can affect its partner's outcomes negatively,
 either contingently, through an associated explicit influence
 attempt, or noncontingently, through a direct power exercise
 (Scheer and Stem 1992). Punitive actions include, for exam-
 ple, a supplier paying fines for late delivery per its prior
 agreement with an industrial customer; a grocer unilaterally
 taking unauthorized deductions off an invoice for a vendor's
 improper palletization; or a megaretailer shifting inventory
 it previously carried to its supplier, while unconditionally
 demanding more frequent deliveries of smaller lots and no
 increase in wholesale price.
 Dependence and Punitive Capability
 What elements in a channel relationship give rise to, or
 inhibit, punitive actions? Recent channels research has
 emphasized dependence and the power that "rests on the
 extent to which B is dependent on A for valued resources"
 (Dwyer 1984, p. 682). When a channel firm possesses val-
 ued resources, such as capital, expertise, information, ser-
 vices, assets, affiliation, or status (Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh
 1987; Scheer and Stem 1992), that generate for its partner
 rewards and benefits that are not easily replaced, the chan-
 nel partner is dependent on the firm (Emerson 1962).
 Although the partner's dependence gives the firm power
 over the partner, the firm's power encompasses more than
 the partner's dependence. A firm also might possess damag-
 ing resources that generate no value for the partner but can
 be used to wound the partner (Molm 1989), such as a verti-
 cally integrated dual channel that competes with the partner
 or legal staff that could bury the partner in litigation. Puni-
 tive capability is the firm's ability and willingness to inflict
 negative consequences on a channel partner. To develop
 punitive capability, a firm must invest in the infrastructure
 and systems to control the withdrawal of valued resources
 and/or the exercise of damaging resources, as well as in per-
 sonnel with the will to impose negative consequences on a
 channel partner. For example, firms such as Lotus 1-2-3 and
 Fiat have developed product tracking systems so they can
 detect gray market sales and appropriately punish offending
 dealers.
 We use the terms punitive capability and punitive actions for two rea-
 sons. First, though some researchers have not linked power with a specific
 use (e.g., Gaski and Nevin 1985), much of the channels research on "coer-
 cive" power and influence has focused more narrowly on that which could
 be, or was, contingently exercised (e.g.. Brown, Lusch, and Nicholson
 1995; John 1984). Because the concept we address is more inclusive than
 that which often is labeled "coercive power," we use different terminology
 to avoid confusion. Second, we use "capability" and "actions" to clarify the
 distinction between the possession of power and its use.
 Dependence is expected to affect punitive acts, but just
 because a firm is able to withdraw valued resources from its
 partner does not imply that it is inclined to do so. The firm's
 accumulation of the rewarding resources that underlie de-
 pendence is essentially neutral-a firm can share those re-
 sources, which thereby creates benefits for the partner, or it
 can punitively withdraw benefits previously provided. Puni-
 tive capability represents a distinct element of a channel
 firm's power-the ability and willingness to inflict negative
 consequences on that partner, regardless of the resources
 available to be used in such a manner. A firm that accumu-
 lates damaging resources and makes its partner aware of that
 accumulation sends an unmistakable message about its
 readiness to use punitive capability. As we examine the
 channel power structure, it is therefore useful to supplement
 an assessment of the partners' dependence with an exami-
 nation of their punitive capabilities.
 Total Power and Power Asymmetry
 In examining the effects of power, channels researchers
 have examined the own power effect, the relationship
 between a firm's power and its use of power (e.g., Gaski and
 Nevin 1985; Hunt and Nevin 1974), and the partner power
 effect, the relationship between a channel partner's power
 over a firm and the firm's use of power (e.g., Frazier, Gill,
 and Kale 1989; Frazier and Rody 1991). More recent empir-
 ical investigations that have focused on the dyadic power
 effect (e.g., Anderson and Narus 1990; Buchanan 1992;
 Geyskens et al. 1996; Heide 1994; Lusch and Brown 1996)
 suggest that looking solely at one firm's power tells only
 part of the story. Behavior and attitudes are affected by total
 power, the sum of both partners' power, and power asym-
 metry, the difference between the partners' power
 (Bacharach and Lawler 1981; Lawler 1986).
 When focusing on total power and power asymmetry,
 studies that include only one firm's power provide no direct
 evidence because of the lack of information about the part-
 ner's power.2 Extant channels literature on total power and
 power asymmetry has focused exclusively on interdepen-
 dence (e.g., Buchanan 1992; Geyskens et al. 1996; Gund-
 lach and Cadotte 1994). Lawler and Bacharach (1987, p.
 447) observe that "while both dependence and punitive ca-
 pability are foundations of power, this does not necessarily
 suggest that theoretical principles or research findings
 which apply to one of these forms of power apply to the oth-
 er." We examine the channel partners' total interdependence
 and interdependence asymmetry as well as their total puni-
 tive capability and punitive capability asymmetry from the
 perspective of a focal firm.
 HYPOTHESES
 For insight on the effects of interdependence and punitive
 capabilities, we turn to two sociological theories that offer
 divergent predictions. Bilateral deterrence theory predicts
 that, as total power increases, punitive acts decline because
 2Finding that an increase in one firm's power is related positively to its
 punitive actions sheds no light on the effects of total power or asymmetry.
 That firm's power increase could be part of a total power increase (if part-
 ner power increases, is constant, or decreases less than the firm's increase),
 no change in total power (if the partner's power decrease equals the firm's
 increase), or a total power decrease (if partner power decreases more than
 the firm's power increase). The firm's power increase therefore could be
 associated with an increase, decrease, or no change in asymmetry.
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 both partners have greater exposure to loss and strong moti-
 vation to avoid that loss; conflict spiral theory, in contrast,
 argues that greater total power results in both partners'
 greater temptation to use, and the actual use of, punitive tac-
 tics (Lawler 1986; Lawler, Ford, and Blegen 1988; Rubin
 and Brown 1975). The primary motivation underlying bilat-
 eral deterrence is loss avoidance, whereas conflict spiral
 hinges on the presumption that a firm will exploit whatever
 power it has to pursue its goals. Because dependence
 embodies the value to be lost if the relationship ends, bilat-
 eral deterrence theory seems applicable to the partners'
 interdependence. Because punitive capability is the stock-
 piling of the potential to inflict damage, conflict spiral the-
 ory seems particularly relevant to the partners' punitive
 capability.
 Effects of the Partners' Interdependence
 Following bilateral deterrence theory, we posit that as the
 partner's power based in the firm's dependence increases,
 the firm's fear of retaliation increases, and the partner's
 expectation of attack decreases. Thus, as the firm and its
 partner share greater interdependence, each increasingly
 fears undermining the relationship and expects that the other
 shares this view. Various benefits have been associated with
 higher levels of channel interdependence, including fewer
 punitive tactics (e.g., Buchanan 1992; Gundlach and
 Cadotte 1994). Consistent with bilateral deterrence theory,
 we hypothesize that increased total interdependence will
 result in fewer punitive actions.
 Bilateral deterrence theory views asymmetric relation-
 ships as inherently unstable; only symmetry deters punitive
 acts, with the greatest deterrence resulting when total power
 is high. Channels researchers have found that symmetric re-
 lationships are more stable and beneficial than asymmetric
 relationships (e.g., Buchanan 1992; Kumar, Scheer, and
 Steenkamp 1995b). Greater asymmetry is expected to gen-
 erate greater punitive tactics by both partners (Bacharach
 and Lawler 1981; Cook and Emerson 1978; Molm 1989). In
 bilateral deterrence theory (Lawler, Ford, and Blegen 1988),
 the dependence of the less dependent firm is the key moti-
 vating element. The less dependent firm focuses on the little
 it has to lose, and it therefore has little fear of retaliation and
 few restraints on its punitive actions. The more dependent
 partner's knowledge that the firm is likely to use punitive
 actions renders its fear of retaliation a moot point. Although
 the more dependent partner has more to lose than the firm,
 it also expects to be attacked, regardless of its actions, and
 therefore has strong incentive to use punitive tactics pre-
 emptively to signal that it will not passively submit, despite
 its relative dependence. On the basis of bilateral deterrence
 theory, we hypothesize that
 HI: As total channel interdependence increases, a firm's use of
 punitive actions decreases.
 H2: As channel interdependence asymmetry increases, (a) the less
 dependent firm's use of punitive actions increases and (b) the
 more dependent firm's use of punitive actions increases.
 It is questionable, however, if this prediction about the
 more dependent partner's heedless use of punitive tactics is
 germane to the context of channel relationships. Contrary to
 bilateral deterrence theory, relative power theory asserts that
 the partner with less power (relative dependence) will be
 inclined to be as inoffensive and nonthreatening as possible,
 so as not to incite the more powerful firm to engage in even
 greater punitive actions. Relative power theory argues that
 increasing interdependence asymmetry will have divergent
 effects on the firm and its channel partner; specifically, the
 less powerful partner will become more reluctant to use
 punitive actions, whereas the more powerful firm will be
 increasingly likely to use punitive tactics (Cook and Emer-
 son 1978; Gundlach and Cadotte 1994; Rubin and Brown
 1975). The less dependent firm has little reason for restraint
 or fear of retaliation because it can exit the relationship
 more easily than its partner can. Because relative power the-
 ory offers a compelling alternative rationale for the more
 dependent channel firm's behavior, we offer an alternate
 hypothesis:
 H2alt: As channel interdependence asymmetry increases, (a) the
 less dependent firm's use of punitive actions increases
 and (b) the more dependent firm's use of punitive actions
 decreases.
 Effects of the Partners' Punitive Capabilities
 In conflict spiral theory, as a firm's punitive capability
 increases, the firm's temptation to use its power grows,
 thereby increasing its partner's expectation of attack
 (Lawler, Ford, and Blegen 1988). As total punitive capabil-
 ity increases, each firm knows that its partner is similarly
 tempted and motivated to use punitive actions. Cultivating a
 partner's dependence might have various purposes, but
 investing in, developing, stockpiling, and making a partner
 aware of the punitive capability of the firm has only one pur-
 pose: That is, it sends an unambiguous signal of the firm's
 readiness to use that capability.3 Evidence also suggests that
 channel firms tend to use their punitive capability (Frazier,
 Gill, and Kale 1989; Gaski and Nevin 1985). Consistent
 with conflict spiral theory, we posit that increasing total
 punitive capability results in greater punitive actions.
 Conflict spiral theory argues that increasing asymmetry
 stabilizes a relationship, because one party clearly is more
 dominant (Lawler, Ford, and Blegen 1988; Rubin and
 Brown 1975). As a firm faces an increasing punitive capa-
 bility deficit, it avoids punitive acts because it realizes that
 the expected gain from such tactics is low. Because punitive
 tactics are unlikely to advance its goals, the firm with lower
 punitive capability will seek other means to gain its more
 powerful partner's cooperation. Conflict spiral theory also
 argues that the dominant partner becomes less likely to use
 its punitive capability because it has a lower expectation of
 being attacked by the less powerful firm and is able to get
 that firm to comply without resorting to punitive tactics.
 Consistent with conflict spiral theory, we hypothesize ef-
 fects for punitive capability that are opposite those of bilat-
 eral deterrence theory:
 H3: As total channel punitive capability increases, a firm's use
 of punitive actions increases.
 H4: As the asymmetry in channel partners' punitive capabilities
 increases, (a) the firm with a punitive capability advantage de-
 creases its use of punitive actions and (b) the firm with a puni-
 tive capability deficit decreases its use of punitive actions.
 It is debatable, however, if a firm with a punitive capabil-
 ity advantage will exercise restraint, given its inherent temp-
 3We thank a reviewer for this insight.
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 tation to use that advantage (Lawler 1986). Relative power
 theory argues that increasing asymmetry will result in greater
 punitive acts by the firm with the greater punitive capability;
 as a firm's punitive capability deficit widens, it is more likely
 to avoid punitive acts that would incur overwhelming retali-
 ation from its more powerful partner (Cook and Emerson
 1978; Gundlach and Cadotte 1994; Rubin and Brown 1975).
 Because relative power theory offers a compelling alternative
 theory about the behavior of a firm with a punitive capability
 advantage, we offer an alternate hypothesis:
 H4aIt: As the asymmetry in channel partners' punitive capabili-
 ties increases, (a) the firm with a punitive capability ad-
 vantage increases its use of punitive actions and (b) the
 firm with a punitive capability deficit decreases its use of
 punitive actions.
 Reciprocation of Partner's Punitive Actions
 Although the partners' interdependence or punitive capa-
 bilities might provide an impetus for punitive actions (i.e., low
 total interdependence and high total punitive capability), firms
 can choose to resist this impulse and refrain from punitive acts
 (Gaski and Nevin 1985). The beneficial effects of a highly
 interdependent relationship similarly can be undermined by
 punitive acts. A channel firm's use of coercive power has been
 associated with reciprocal coercive actions by its partner (Fra-
 zier and Rody 1991; Frazier and Summers 1986). All other
 things being equal, the partner's use of punitive actions will
 increase the channel firm's use of punitive actions.
 This reciprocity effect could be moderated by the channel
 partners' interdependence or punitive capabilities. As a
 firm's power advantage in interdependence or punitive ca-
 pability increases, it is increasingly likely to reciprocate its
 partner's punitive actions. Failure to do so would undermine
 the firm's advantage, for reciprocation sends a signal to the
 partner, verifying and reinforcing the firm's advantaged po-
 sition. In contrast, as a firm's power deficit based in punitive
 capability or dependence widens, it is increasingly unlikely
 to reciprocate punitive acts. It is instead more likely to
 defuse the situation without resorting to retaliation, either
 through compliance or other nonconfrontational actions.
 Some supporting evidence is found in a study conducted in
 India by Frazier, Gill, and Kale (1989). They speculate that
 dealers refrain from reciprocating their suppliers' punitive
 actions because the dealers are relatively dependent on their
 suppliers. We therefore hypothesize that
 H5: A channel firm's use of punitive actions is related positive-
 ly to its partner's use of punitive actions.
 H6: The reciprocity effect is moderated by the channel interde-
 pendence asymmetry. Specifically, as the channel interde-
 pendence asymmetry increases, (a) the less dependent firm is
 more likely to reciprocate punitive actions and (b) the more
 dependent firm is less likely to reciprocate punitive actions.
 H7: The reciprocity effect is moderated by the channel partners'
 punitive capability asymmetry. Specifically, as the asymme-
 try in channel partners' punitive capabilities increases,
 (a) the firm with greater punitive capability is more likely to
 reciprocate punitive actions and (b) the firm with less puni-
 tive capability is less likely to reciprocate punitive actions.
 METHOD
 Sample and Data Collection Procedure
 Our sample consisted of automobile dealers in the
 Netherlands, drawn from a list of 4000 new-car dealerships
 that represent the entire country. Because this list, which
 was supplied by the Dutch Association of Car Dealers, did
 not name the owners, questionnaires were addressed to the
 Owner. Informants were thus dealership owners-the peo-
 ple most knowledgeable about the dealer's relationship with
 its primary supplier. Each owner-informant reported on the
 dealer's relationship with the automotive supplier that
 accounts for the largest percentage of its sales.
 The Netherlands has no domestic automobile manufac-
 turing, and therefore, dealers' direct suppliers are importers
 of a brand. The Dutch automobile market is very dispersed,
 with the market leader holding less than 15% market share.
 Legal restrictions offer considerable protection to dealers, as
 dealers typically have exclusive geographic sales territories
 and new dealerships are limited through a strict governmen-
 tal permitting process. Furthermore, 21% of Dutch automo-
 bile dealers represent two or more manufacturers. As a result
 of all these factors, some dealers in the Netherlands perceive
 themselves as more powerful (on dependence and/or coer-
 cive capability) than their suppliers, which thereby ensures
 adequate variation to test the power asymmetry hypotheses.
 An original English version of our questionnaire first was
 translated into Dutch by one person and then retranslated in-
 to English by a second person, each of whom was fluent in
 both languages. Any differences that emerged were recon-
 ciled by the two translators. As a final pretest, to ensure that
 the owners could comprehend the Dutch translation ade-
 quately, a draft of the questionnaire was administered to
 several dealership owners in face-to-face interviews. A few
 minor wording changes were made to improve the clarity of
 the final questionnaire.
 This questionnaire was mailed to a random sample of
 1600 owners, drawn from our list of 4000 dealers. Resource
 limitations precluded follow-up letters to nonrespondents,
 resulting in a response rate of 19%, with 309 questionnaires
 returned. After we eliminated questionnaires with excessive
 missing data, there were 289 responses constituting the final
 sample. Our response rate, though low, is within the range
 reported for channels studies. Because Armstrong and Over-
 ton's (1977) procedure indicated no significant differences
 (p > .10) between early and late respondents, nonresponse
 bias does not appear to be a problem. Subsequent telephone
 calls made to a subset of owners confirmed that the infor-
 mant was the person most knowledgeable about the dealer's
 relationship with the supplier.
 Operational Measures
 For the empirical test of the hypotheses, our focal depen-
 dent variable is the dealer's reported use of punitive actions.
 Because a channel firm's behavior is based on its percep-
 tions (e.g., Anderson and Narus 1990; Anderson and Weitz
 1992), all elements are measured from the dealer's perspec-
 tive. Multi-item measures based on construct definitions and
 channels research precedents were developed. Dealer infor-
 mants reported their perceptions regarding both the dealer's
 and the supplier's punitive actions, punitive capability, and
 dependence. See the Appendix for the measurement items.
 Punitive actions. Punitive actions were conceptualized as
 the intentional imposition of negative consequences that in-
 flict damage on a firm's channel partner (Gaski and Nevin
 1985; Hunt and Nevin 1974), whether contingently, follow-
 ing a threat (e.g., Frazier and Summers 1986), or noncontin-
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 gently, without prior warning (Scheer and Stem 1992). Al-
 though we a priori expected that the partners' interdepen-
 dence and punitive capabilities would affect both contingent
 and noncontingent punitive actions in the same way, to be
 comprehensive, we included items that measured both
 types. Six parallel items were constructed to measure the
 supplier's and the dealer's use of punitive actions.
 Punitive capability. Punitive capability was defined as a
 firm's ability and willingness to inflict negative conse-
 quences on its channel partner. Four parallel items that
 elicited the capacity to inflict damage on a channel partner
 or its outcomes were developed to measure dealer and sup-
 plier punitive capability (Gaski and Nevin 1985; Lawler and
 Bacharach 1987).
 Interdependence. In accordance with Gaski's (1987) ex-
 hortation for channels researchers to incorporate both of
 Emerson's (1962) facets of dependence in their measures,
 we view a firm's dependence as flowing from (1) the value
 received by the firm through its relationship with the partner
 and (2) the extent to which the partner and the value re-
 ceived are irreplaceable. The value received from the rela-
 tionship by the dealer was measured with three items that
 assessed the percentage of sales and profits the supplier's
 line provided and the importance of the supplier's line to the
 achievement of the dealer's goals. Irreplaceability of the
 supplier was measured by three items inspired by El-Ansary
 and Stem's (1972) study and the replaceability items used
 by Heide and John (1988). The dealer's perception of the
 supplier's dependence was measured using similar, mirror-
 image items, with one exception. The "percentage of profit"
 item was replaced by an item that assessed the extent to
 which the supplier considered the dealer's trade area a key
 territory (Frazier and Rody 1991), because individual deal-
 ers are unlikely to know how much of the supplier's total
 profits are generated by their efforts, but they do have a
 more confident estimate of their territory's importance to
 the supplier.4
 Following precedent (Frazier, Gill, and Kale 1989; Fra-
 zier and Rody 1991), we conceptualized dependence as a
 multidimensional composite index (Howell 1987). Consis-
 tent with how such formative indicators are interpreted
 (Bollen and Lennox 1991), we posit that higher scores on
 each of the dependence items causes higher dependence (the
 construct). Each item represents a dimension of dependence,
 and the construct of dependence is defined as the total of the
 scores across all of these items and not as the joint intercor-
 relations among the items (Howell 1987). Because depen-
 dence can be created in alternative ways, we do not
 anticipate that an increase in dependence will simultane-
 ously increase all items. As Bollen and Lennox (1991, p.
 312) note, internal consistency is not a criterion for assess-
 ing the validity of such multidimensional composites, but
 rather "to assess validity we need to examine other variables
 that are effects of the latent construct." Support for our
 hypotheses provides evidence of the nomological validity of
 our dependence measures.
 To create the dependence composites, we first converted
 the items requiring percentage responses into seven-point
 4Correlations between our six-item dependence measure and a five-item
 dependence measure that omits the nonparallel item are .948 for dealer
 dependence and .957 for supplier dependence. Regression results also are
 substantively the same.
 scales, following Frazier and Rody's (1991) precedent. The
 correlations of these recoded items with the raw percentage
 scores are extremely high, ranging from .987 to .996. As an
 alternative to converting these items in this manner, we con-
 sidered standardizing the raw dependence scales before
 computing the dependence composites. Because the relative
 distribution inherent in standardization results in many deal-
 ers appearing to be relatively more powerful than is indicat-
 ed by the raw, unstandardized scales, we adopted the more
 conservative, unstandardized approach.5 For both dealer and
 supplier dependence, we then separately aggregated the
 three items that measured each facet of dependence (value
 received and irreplaceability). Finally, we averaged the two
 facets to produce composite measures of dealer dependence
 and supplier dependence.
 Measure Validation
 Punitive actions. In an exploratory factor analysis of the
 six items measuring the dealer's punitive actions, both the
 eigenvalue test and the scree test indicated that only one un-
 derlying factor was present. Similar results were obtained
 from a factor analysis of the six items measuring supplier
 use of punitive actions. The lowest factor loading in either
 analysis was .43. Furthermore, a factor analysis of all twelve
 items demonstrated a clear separation, with each item load-
 ing highest on the factor it was hypothesized to measure.
 Cronbach's alpha was .72 and .74 for the dealer's and sup-
 plier's punitive actions, respectively.
 Punitive capability. In an exploratory factor analysis of
 the four items measuring dealer punitive capability, eigen-
 value and scree tests indicated only one underlying factor. A
 similar factor analysis of the four supplier punitive capabil-
 ity items revealed the same. In both cases, all factor loadings
 were greater than .50. Furthermore, a factor analysis of all
 eight items demonstrated a clear separation between the
 dealer's and supplier's punitive capability, with each item
 loading highest on the factor it was hypothesized to mea-
 sure. Cronbach's alpha was .78 and .73 for the dealer's and
 supplier's punitive capability, respectively.
 Dependence. Given our formative logic for the depen-
 dence items, conducting factor analysis on them was not ap-
 propriate. We checked for convergent validity of our depen-
 dence scales and found that the correlations of single-item
 global assessments of dealer and supplier dependence (e.g.,
 "How dependent is this supplier on your dealership?") with
 their respective composite dependence scales were both
 greater than .40 and significant (p < .001).
 Confirmatory factor analysis. Finally, using confirmatory
 factor analysis, we analyzed the six constructs of dealer and
 supplier dependence, dealer and supplier punitive capabili-
 ty, and dealer and supplier punitive actions. To derive one
 indicator of supplier dependence and one of dealer depen-
 dence for this analysis, we averaged the scores of the three
 items pertaining to each dimension of dependence (value re-
 ceived and irreplaceability). As recommended by Anderson
 and Gerbing (1988), the error for these two measures was
 set at . l0 each.
 The six-factor model (22 indicators) yielded an adequate
 overall fit: Z2 (196) = 306.42, goodness-of-fit index (GFI) =
 SCorrelations of the composite dependence measures, using standardized
 scores with the composites constructed with the converted items, are .988
 for dealer dependence and .905 for supplier dependence.
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 .90, and comparative fit index (CFI) = .97. The GFI and CFI
 indices are at or above the generally recommended .90 level.
 All factor loadings were significant (p < .0001), demon-
 strating convergent validity (Anderson and Gerbing 1988),
 and all factor intercorrelations were significantly below
 unity (p < .0001), demonstrating discriminant validity
 (Anderson and Gerbing 1988). We therefore conclude that
 our measures demonstrate adequate unidimensionality, con-
 vergent validity, discriminant validity, and reliability.
 Hypothesis-Testing Procedures
 Scale items were averaged to obtain composites measur-
 ing the dealer's reported punitive capability (DPunCap),
 dependence (DDep), and punitive acts (DPunAct) and
 dealer perceptions of its supplier's punitive capability
 (SPunCap), dependence (SDep), and punitive acts (SPun-
 Act). Total punitive capability (TotPunCap) was con-
 structed by summing dealer and supplier punitive capability
 scores. Total interdependence (TotDep) was constructed by
 summing dealer and supplier dependence scores. Means,
 deviations, and correlations appear in the Appendix.
 To examine the asymmetry hypotheses, we sought a
 method that allows for changes in asymmetry to have dif-
 ferent effects when the firm has a power advantage, versus
 a power deficit, on that dimension. Using a single variable
 to assess asymmetry does not permit this. For example, if a
 "dealer relative dependence" measure (DDep minus SDep)
 is used, a decrease in that variable could involve (1) a re-
 duction in asymmetry (dealer dependence deficit is re-
 duced), (2) no change in asymmetry (shift from dealer de-
 pendence deficit to advantage), or (3) an increase in asym-
 metry (dealer dependence advantage is increased). We need-
 ed an analysis procedure that enabled us to test whether the
 effects of interdependence asymmetry are as predicted by
 bilateral deterrence theory, relative power theory, or neither
 and whether conflict spiral theory, relative power theory, or
 neither is supported for punitive capability asymmetry.
 Spline regression analysis (Johnston 1984) enables us to
 incorporate the direction of asymmetry. To do this, we must
 construct the linear splines that represent the dealer power
 advantage and the dealer power deficit positions and then in-
 corporate each spline segment as a separate variable in our re-
 gression equation (Johnston 1984). For interdependence
 asymmetry, we need two variables: dealer power advantage
 based in dependence (AdvDep) and dealer power deficit
 based in dependence (DefDep). AdvDep is equal to SDep -
 DDep when SDep > DDep and zero when DDep > SDep.
 Similarly, DefDep is equal to DDep - SDep when DDep >
 SDep and zero when SDep > DDep. Therefore, when the
 dealer is less dependent than the supplier (i.e., has a power
 advantage), AdvDep reflects the degree of asymmetry and
 DefDep is zero; when the dealer is more dependent than the
 supplier (i.e., has a power deficit), DefDep reflects the degree
 of asymmetry and AdvDep is zero. The baseline is channel
 symmetry (SDep = DDep), where both AdvDep and DefDep
 are zero. Similar computations were used to construct dealer
 advantage in punitive capability (AdvPunCap) and dealer
 deficit in punitive capability (DefPunCap).6
 6The single variable approach is simply a special case of the spline
 approach, in which the effect of DefDep is constrained to be -I*AdvDep
 and the effect of DetPunCap is constrained to be -l*AdvPunCap. Spline
 analysis is more flexible and provides more information about the nature of
 the effects of asymmetry. This precision is needed to test our hypotheses.
 All hypotheses were tested simultaneously by estimating
 the regression equation:
 DPunAct = l1 TotDep (HI)
 + p2 AdvDep + p3 DefDep (H2)
 + p4 TotPunCap (H3)
 + p5 AdvPunCap + 16 DefPunCap (H4)
 + ,37 SPunAct (H5)
 + p8 AdvDep*SPunAct + [9 DefDep*SPunAct (H6)
 + P0IO AdvPunCap*SPunAct +
 P II DefPunCap*SPunAct (H7).
 As the regression equation demonstrates, we test seven
 main effects, including two main effects for dependence
 asymmetry (AdvDep and DefDep), two main effects for
 asymmetry in punitive capability (AdvPunCap and DefPun-
 Cap), and the main effect of supplier punitive actions (SPun-
 Act). The four interactions involve supplier punitive actions
 and the four power asymmetry variables. The predictor vari-
 ables involved in the interactions were mean-centered, a
 procedure commonly recommended to reduce multi-
 collinearity and provide unbiased parameter estimates
 (Aiken and West 1991; Jaccard, Turrisi, and Wan 1990). To
 check if this was successful, we employed two widely used
 measures of multicollinearity (Judge et al. 1988). The max-
 imum variance inflation factor of 1.88 and the maximum
 condition index of 19.61 were well below the levels (10 and
 30, respectively) that commonly signal detrimental multi-
 collinearity (Mason and Perrault 1991).
 RESULTS
 We report our results in Table 1. Consistent with bilateral
 deterrence theory, a dealer's perception of greater total
 channel interdependence has a negative impact on its puni-
 tive actions (P1 = -.105, p = .05). Consistent with conflict
 spiral theory, greater perceived total punitive capability has
 a positive effect on punitive actions (034 = .128, p < .05). H1
 and H3 are supported.
 Compared with symmetric relations, increased interde-
 pendence asymmetry did not have a significant effect on
 punitive actions, neither when the asymmetry was in the
 firm's favor (j32 = .047, n.s.) nor when it was in favor of the
 Table 1
 REGRESSION RESULTS
 Dealer Punitive Action.s
 hidependent Variables Betas












 F(l 1,277) = 9.378, p < .001.
 ap < .001, two-sided.
 bp < .05, two-sided.
 cp = .06, two-sided.
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 supplier ([3 = -.004, n.s.). Because neither of the two main
 effects of dependence asymmetry is significant, both H2 and
 H2alt must be rejected.7
 The main effects of punitive capability asymmetry sup-
 port the relative power theory hypothesis (H4alt). Compared
 with symmetric relations, as the dealer's perceived punitive
 capability advantage increases, the dealer is more likely to
 use punitive actions ([5 = .157, p < .05); in contrast, as its
 perceived punitive capability deficit increases, the dealer is
 less likely to use punitive actions (136 = -.131, p < .05).8
 The reciprocation hypothesis (Hs) is supported. The deal-
 er's perception of supplier punitive actions has a strong pos-
 itive effect on its own punitive acts ([37 = .361, p < .001).
 This main effect is moderated by the interdependence and
 punitive capability asymmetry. A dealer is more likely to
 reciprocate a supplier's punitive actions as its perceived ad-
 vantage in either dependence (38 = . 114, p = .06) or punitive
 capability (P310 = .141, p < .05) increases. There is no mod-
 erating effect when the dealer has a perceived deficit in de-
 pendence (g39 = .037, n.s.) or punitive capability (31I =
 -.075, n.s.). H6a and H7a are supported, but H6b and H7b are
 rejected.
 DISCUSSION
 In summary, perceived total interdependence has a nega-
 tive effect on the dealer's punitive actions; perceptions of
 total punitive capability and supplier punitive actions have
 positive effects on the dealer's punitive actions; and inter-
 dependence asymmetry has no effect on punitive actions.
 Increased perceived punitive capability asymmetry
 increases punitive actions by dealers that have an advantage
 in punitive capability and decreases punitive actions by
 dealers that have a deficit in punitive capability. Finally,
 dealers that perceive an advantage in either dependence or
 punitive capability are more likely to reciprocate punitive
 actions as their advantage widens.
 Contributions
 Power asymmetry analysis approach. Research has
 moved toward examining the effects of the dyadic channel
 power structure (Anderson and Narus 1990; Buchanan
 1992; Gundlach and Cadotte 1994). Building on these
 precedents, we distinguish between total power and power
 asymmetry and conduct a comprehensive investigation of
 both the direction of the asymmetry (as Buchanan does) and
 the degree of asymmetry (as Gundlach and Cadotte do).
 The spline approach enables us to estimate two regression
 coefficients for the effects of power asymmetry: one coeffi-
 cient estimates the effects of power asymmetry when it is in
 favor of the focal firm, and the other estimates the effects of
 power asymmetry when it is favor of the partner. An analy-
 sis that does not consider the direction of asymmetry cannot
 identify whether bilateral deterrence, conflict spiral, or rela-
 tive power theory is supported, if any. The predictions for
 the regression coefficients representing power advantage
 versus power deficit follow a distinct pattern for each of
 these theories, as we demonstrate in Table 2.
 7Moreover, the effects of AdvDep and DetDep are not significantly dif-
 ferent (p > .10).
 8A follow-up test on the regression coefficients indicates that the effect
 of AdvPunCap is significantly different from that of DefPunCap (p < .01),
 which provides further support for H4F,ll.
 Table 2
 EFFECTS ON PUNITIVE ACTIONS PREDICTED
 Spline Regression Variables Single Variable
 Power Power Power
 Theory Advantage Deficit Difference
 Bilateral Deterrence + + 0
 Conflict Spiral - - 0
 Relative Power + - +
 In contrast, for an alternative construction using a single
 variable, such as the partners' relative power difference
 (e.g., supplier dependence minus dealer dependence), to as-
 sess the effects of asymmetry, the predictions for that single
 variable's regression coefficient would be zero for both the
 bilateral deterrence and conflict spiral theories (as the op-
 posing bidirectional effects cancel each other) and positive
 for the relative power theory. With the single variable ap-
 proach, we would be unable to determine whether a non-
 significant coefficient indicates (1) support for the bilateral
 deterrence theory, (2) support for the conflict spiral theory,
 or (3) that asymmetry has no effect. The theoretical and
 managerial implications of these three scenarios clearly are
 completely different. Only spline regression provides the
 additional information that enables us to determine which
 explanation is correct. To the best of our knowledge, this is
 the first study to conduct such an asymmetry analysis.
 Interdependence and punitive capabilities. Previous stud-
 ies investigating total power and power asymmetry have fo-
 cused exclusively on dependence (e.g., Buchanan 1992;
 Geyskens et al. 1996; Gundlach and Cadotte 1994; Heide
 1994; Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp 1995b; Lusch and
 Brown 1996). Because dependence is based in the value a
 firm receives through the channel relationship and the extent
 to which that value is not available through alternatives
 (Emerson 1962), interdependence forms a structural back-
 drop for the channel relationship. But channel firm behavior
 also is affected by the human element. Power based in a
 partner's dependence is essentially neutral, as it can be used
 either to facilitate collaboration or to wound or extract con-
 cessions from the partner. Firms facing identical interdepen-
 dence structures might have diverse dispositional or situa-
 tional characteristics that lead them to differ in their punitive
 actions. Regardless of the interdependence structure, a chan-
 nel firm might or might not choose to invest in and cultivate
 the mechanisms, attitudes, and personnel required to inflict
 damage on a channel partner. Developing punitive capabili-
 ty is therefore of a very different character than promoting a
 partner's dependence, for stockpiling punitive capability has
 no purpose other than to be able to deploy it through puni-
 tive actions.
 This is the first channels study to examine total punitive
 capability and punitive capability asymmetry in addition to
 interdependence. Our results confirm that punitive capabil-
 ity has a distinct effect on channel firm behavior, beyond
 that of interdependence. Adding the three punitive capabil-
 ity variables (TotPunCap, AdvPunCap, and DefPunCap) to
 a regression equation, which includes only the three interde-
 pendence variables (TotDep, AdvDep, and DefDep), signif-
 icantly increases the variance explained in dealer punitive
 actions from .025 to .106.
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 Because punitive actions are affected by both channel
 partners' interdependence and punitive capabilities, failure
 to consider punitive capability can misrepresent the channel
 partners' concerns and options. An assessment of both the
 channel interdependence structure and the partners' punitive
 capability is needed to gain a more comprehensive under-
 standing of the channel relationship.
 We find that the effect of total channel interdependence
 on dealer punitive actions was as predicted by bilateral de-
 terrence theory, the effect of total punitive capability was as
 predicted by conflict spiral theory, and the effect of punitive
 capability asymmetry was as predicted by relative power
 theory. Although each theory adds to our understanding of
 channels, none offers a complete picture. We also find no
 direct relationship between interdependence asymmetry and
 dealer punitive actions. Gundlach and Cadotte (1994) simi-
 larly report no effect of asymmetry on the use of threats and
 punishments. Although caution is advisable when interpret-
 ing null effects, the near-zero beta values in our study
 strongly suggest that interdependence asymmetry has no di-
 rect impact on dealer punitive actions. Just as power based
 in a partner's dependence can be used either positively or
 negatively, interdependence asymmetry, in and of itself,
 will neither promote nor inhibit the use of punitive actions.
 The decision to use punitive actions versus other available
 courses of action will be based on elements other than the
 interdependence asymmetry, such as punitive capabilities,
 the partner's punitive acts, and other situational, interper-
 sonal, and personal factors that have yet to be researched.
 Moderation of the reciprocity effect. Although the under-
 lying channel interdependence and punitive capabilities can
 instigate or inhibit dealer punitive actions, the strongest pre-
 dictor of a dealer's punitive acts is its supplier's use of puni-
 tive tactics. Adding the main effect of supplier punitive ac-
 tions to a regression equation that includes the six interde-
 pendence and punitive capability variables (TotDep,
 AdvDep, DefDep, TotPunCap, AdvPunCap, and DefPun-
 Cap) significantly increases the variance explained in deal-
 er punitive actions from .106 to .234. This result emphasizes
 that channel firms are not prisoners of the underlying pow-
 er structure in which they are embedded (Kumar, Scheer,
 and Steenkamp 1995b); the human element or other factors
 can override the dictates of the underlying interdependence
 and punitive capabilities, either to a beneficial or detrimen-
 tal effect.
 Although, similar to previous channels studies, we find a
 reciprocity effect, we break new ground by demonstrating
 that reciprocity is moderated by the channel interdepen-
 dence structure and punitive capabilities. Adding the four
 terms that estimate the interaction between asymmetry and
 supplier punitive actions significantly increases the variance
 explained in dealer punitive acts from .234 to .271. Our
 finding that a firm is more likely to reciprocate its partner's
 punitive acts as its power advantage increases provides
 empirical support for the contention that reciprocity is
 affected by the power structure (Frazier, Gill, and Kale
 1989; Frazier and Rody 1991).
 Study setting. We build on the insights derived from
 Gundlach and Cadotte's (1994) experimental study by ex-
 amining the effects of total interdependence and interdepen-
 dence asymmetry through a field study conducted in the
 Netherlands. Few channel studies are in non-U.S. settings,
 with the notable exception of those conducted in India by
 Kale (Frazier, Gill, and Kale 1989; Kale 1986). As firms be-
 come increasingly international in character, it becomes im-
 portant to investigate channels in different cultural contexts.
 Limitations
 Several limitations of this study must be noted. First, we
 gathered data from only one side of the dyad. This is consis-
 tent with our dependent variable-a dealer's punitive actions
 will be based on its perceptions. However, examining the sup-
 plier's perceptions and its reported use of punitive actions
 deserves further study. Having data from only dealers pre-
 cluded any examination of the effects of interdependence and
 punitive capabilities on the supplier's punitive actions. We
 also cannot address whether or how the supplier's and dealer's
 perceptions differ in the channel dyad. Investigating both
 channel partners' perceptions of interdependence, punitive
 capabilities, and punitive actions would add greater insights.
 Second, because we developed new measures of punitive
 capability and punitive actions for this study, additional re-
 finement is needed to clarify the distinctions between de-
 pendence, punitive capability, and punitive actions. Consis-
 tent with Gaski and Nevin's (1985) study, the low correla-
 tions between punitive capability and punitive actions sug-
 gest that the informants in this study were able to differenti-
 ate between the potential to exercise power and its actual
 use. Additional research is needed to develop more precise
 measures of the various types of potential punitive actions
 (e.g., contingent/noncontingent, threats/punishments), so as
 to examine whether they have differential effects.
 Third, our research was conducted in a particular setting-
 automobile dealerships in the Netherlands. Questions of gen-
 eralizability, both with respect to channels other than auto-
 mobiles and countries other than the Netherlands, remain.
 Fourth, negative affect might account for part of the ap-
 parent relationship between punitive capability and punitive
 actions, but this is more likely for attitudes than for struc-
 tural variables such as interdependence and punitive capa-
 bility. It is unlikely that this was a problem in this study, as
 a four-item measure of negative affect (anger, hostility, frus-
 tration, and resentment) was not significantly correlated
 (p < .05) with supplier or dealer punitive capability.
 Future Research Directions
 The current emphasis on close relationships or partner-
 ships has led some researchers to contend that power is now
 irrelevant in channel relationships, particularly the negative
 aspects of power and its use (e.g., Morgan and Hunt 1994,
 pp. 33-34). In part, this might be due to an implicit assump-
 tion that power is an inherently ominous force. Yet power
 can be used to lead, coordinate, and collaborate, just as it
 can be used to exploit and dominate. Although we do not
 want to downplay the importance of relationships, power
 continues to play a central role. Even in highly enmeshed
 channel relationships, punitive actions frequently arise.
 When managers are asked about channel partners' activities,
 punitive tactics and coercion often quickly come to mind.
 Even when the actual incidence of punitive actions is low,
 an undercurrent nevertheless remains regarding the punitive
 capability that each channel partner holds. Partnerships and
 punitive actions both belong in the mainstream of channels
 inquiry, for both involve the exercise of power and are
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 important issues for marketing practitioners. As Brown,
 Lusch, and Nicholson (1995) observe, it is premature to
 close the book on power in marketing channels.
 Although punitive actions are affected by both channel
 partners' interdependence and punitive capabilities, these
 underlying channel power elements do not control the part-
 ners' destiny. Firms can overcome a channel structure that
 incites conflict, just as they can squander a channel structure
 that promotes cooperation. Research is needed to investigate
 situational elements in the relationship that can promote, in-
 hibit, or moderate punitive behavior, such as cultural fac-
 tors, relational norms, environmental conditions, channel
 firms' procedural fairness, relationship-building activities,
 personal inclinations or agendas, or interpersonal aspects.
 Even in long-term cooperative relationships, firms some-
 times make justifiable strategic decisions in one arena of op-
 erations that coincidentally injure some of their partners. For
 example, McDonald's opens new stores as part of a legiti-
 mate growth strategy to increase corporate sales and profits.
 Many longtime McDonald's franchisees blame their falling
 per-store sales volumes on the franchisor's relentless push
 to open new outlets ever closer to their existing stores. Al-
 though these negative consequences are not intentional on
 the part of McDonald's, and thus do not indicate punitive
 actions by our definition, the franchisees nevertheless are in-
 jured. This suggests that it is important for a firm to consid-
 er the extent to which its actions will have collateral effects
 on its partners. Failure to account for these ramifications is
 particularly problematic when there are negative conse-
 quences, for the channel partner's attitudes and actions will
 be affected not only by the firm's intentional punitive ac-
 tions, but also by actions that coincidentally damage the
 partner. We believe this is another area for further research.
 And finally, an especially intriguing avenue for addition-
 al research is the examination of a firm's strategic motiva-
 tions for punitive actions and the long-term effects of using
 Appendix*
 Dealer punitive actions**
 I. Our firm undermines or punishes the supplier when they don't follow
 our guidelines and recommendations.
 2. If the supplier doesn't do what we want, we provide poorer service and
 become difficult to work with.
 3. When the supplier rejects our suggestions, they receive harsher
 treatment from our firm.
 4. Our firm penalizes the supplier without any warning at times.
 5. Sometimes, without any prior notice, we withhold information or
 services that we previously provided to the supplier.
 6. Some of our firm's actions have a negative effect on the supplier, but
 they cannot do anything to prevent it.
 Dealer punitive capability**
 If we wanted to, we have the capability to
 1. severely penalize the supplier if they are uncooperative.
 2. hurt the supplier's ability to serve their customers effectively.
 3. make things difficult for them.
 4. tie the supplier up in an expensive legal battle.
 Dealer dependence
 a. Value received
 I. Approximately, what percentage of your firm's sales are accounted for
 by this supplier's line?***
 2. Approximately, what percentage of your firm's profits are accounted
 for by this supplier's line?***
 3. Our relationship with the supplier is very important to the achievement
 of our organizational goals.
 b. Irreplaceability
 1. There are other suppliers who could provide us with comparable
 product lines. (R) t
 2. Our total costs of switching to a competing manufacturer's line would
 be prohibitive.
 3. It would be difficult for our firm to replace the sales and profits
 generated from this supplier's line.
 Supplier dependence
 a. Value received
 1. To the best of your knowledge, approximately what percentage of the
 supplier's sales in this trading area are accounted for by your firm?***
 2. The supplier considers our trade area a key market for their products.
 3. The supplier's relationship with us is very important to the supplier's
 achievement of their goals.
 b. Irreplaceability
 I. In our trade area, there are other firms who could provide the supplier
 with comparable distribution.(R)
 2. In our trade area, the supplier would incur minimal costs in replacing
 our firm with another dealer.(R)
 3. It would be difficult for the supplier to replace the sales and profits our
 d alership generates.
 Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations
 Standard
 Variable Mean Deviations 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
 1. Dealer Punitive Actions (DPunAct) 2.60 .93 1.00
 2. Total Interdependence (TotDep) 9.56 1.39 -. 15b 1.00
 3. Dealer Power Advantage in Interdependence (AdvDep) .38 .62 .03 .04 1.00
 4. Dealer Power Deficit in Interdependence (DefDep) .61 .76 -.02 -.08 -.49c 1.00
 5. Total Punitive Capability (TotPunCap) 7.94 1.91 .24c .11 -.05 .04 1.00
 6. Dealer Advantage on Punitive Capability (AdvPunCap) .15 .48 .05 0.00 .09 -. 17b -.13a 1.00
 7. Dealer Deficit in Punitive Capability (DefPunCap) 1.79 1.47 -.12a .07 -.16 .28c -.02 -.38c 1.00
 8. Supplier Punitive Actions (SPunAct) 3.89 1.08 .40c -.09 -.09 .15a .32c -.15 .19b 1.00
 *Seven-point scales, with "strongly disagree" and "strongly agree" as the anchors, unless noted otherwise.
 **The supplier items were identical except for changes to reflect the supplier.
 ***These items invoked percentage responses, which were converted to seven-point scales.
 titems marked (R) are reverse-scored.
 ap < .05.
 p <.01.
 cp < .001.
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 punitive actions to achieve the implementation of a strategy.
 To transform an intended marketing strategy into a realized
 strategy, firms must work with partners to implement those
 plans. Although, particularly in interdependent relation-
 ships, there are strong motivations to use positive and col-
 laborative methods to gain a partner's cooperation, there
 will be times when such mechanisms cannot get the job
 done. For example, a manufacturer might have to use puni-
 tive actions to discipline some partners that are not per-
 forming according to the agreed norms and thereby are in-
 juring other partners. Such punitive actions might increase
 the manufacturer's standing with these other partners. Al-
 though extant channels literature recommends that channel
 firms avoid punitive actions, this recommendation is based
 solely on the reaction of the actor that is the target of the
 punitive action. However, the impact on other observers or
 what could be termed the "observer effect" might be more
 critical to the manufacturer's overall strategy. Dyadic rela-
 tionships are embedded in a larger network of relationships,
 and the anticipated constructive effects of punitive actions
 in certain circumstances also must be considered.
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